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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 (the "Act") into law. The Act contained a general section stat-
ing that its provisions should take effect upon enactment.1 What the
Act did not do, however, is indicate whether it should apply to cases
pending at the time of its enactment. Since the Act is more favorable to
plaintiffs than was its predecessor,2 plaintiffs whose cases were pending
at the time of its enactment have attempted to amend their complaints
to benefit from the new Act's provisions.3 Congress's failure to indicate
whether the Act should apply to cases pending at the time of its enact-
ment has forced the courts to make their own judgments on the Act's
retroactivity.'
The Supreme Court's refusal to clarify its past decisions regarding
the retroactive application of legislation complicates the lower courts'
analyses of this issue.' The Court's past decisions present the lower
courts with two completely different starting points for analyzing
whether a statute should apply retroactively.' The difficulty in applying
Supreme Court precedents stems from the fact that the two Supreme
Court directives on the subject seem to diametrically oppose one an-
other. Therefore, not only must the lower courts determine what Con-
gress was thinking when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
lower courts also must determine what the Supreme Court was thinking
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 402(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991).
2. The Act allows Title VII plaintiffs to seek compensatory and punitive damages. Id. § 102,
105 Stat. at 1072-73, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (Supp. 1992). If plaintiffs choose to seek
monetary damages, the Act guarantees them the right to trial by jury. Id. The Civil Rights Act of
1964, in contrast, provided for neither compensatory and punitive damages nor a jury trial.
3. Most cases regarding retroactive application of the Act involve plaintiffs who seek to
amend their complaints to include claims for monetary damages and demands for jury trials under
Section 102 of the new Act. See, for example, Watkins v. Bessemer State Tech. College, 782 F.
Supp. 581 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (allowing plaintiff to amend complaint to request trial by jury and to
claim monetary damages).
4. Many courts have criticized Congress for its failure to reach a definitive decision on the
Act's retroactivity. As one court lamented, "The ultimate answer on the retroactivity or non-retro-
activity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will be long in coming, and only after thousands of judicial
hours, which Congress could easily have saved, are spent." King v. Shelby Medical Center, 779 F.
Supp. 157, 158 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
5. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), the Court ac-
knowledged that its past decisions on the issue of the retroactive application of statutes were "[iln
apparent tension." Id. at 837. The Court, however, declined the opportunity to clarify its position
on the issue.
6. Compare Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (ruling that a strong
presumption exists against the retroactive application of statutes) with Bradley v. School Bd. of




when it handed down two apparently irreconcilable lines of analysis on
the same subject.
Since the early 1800s, the Supreme Court generally has held that a
strong presumption that statutes should not operate retroactively exists
and that that presumption is rebuttable only by strong evidence of
Congress's intent to the contrary.7 The Court reaffirmed this presump-
tion as recently as 1988 in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.,
The Supreme Court, however, also has espoused a presumption in
favor of retroactivity that directly opposes its prior presumption against
retroactivity. In a line of cases anchored by United States v. Schooner
Peggy,9 the Supreme Court has directed that a court should apply the
law in existence at the time of its decision.'0 In Bradley v. School Board
of Richmond," the Court relied on Schooner Peggy and its progeny in
holding that every statute contains a presumption of retroactivity. 2
The lower courts must resolve a difficult question at the outset.
Should a court adopt Bowen and begin its analysis with the presump-
tion that the Act does not apply retroactively, or should it adopt Brad-
ley and begin with the presumption that the Act should apply
retroactively? The lower courts have had great difficulty reaching a con-
sensus on this issue.'
3
This Recent Development analyzes the retroactive application of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part II explores the conflicting presump-
tions the Supreme Court has created and argues that the Court should
clarify retroactivity analysis by rejecting the Bradley presumption. Part
III discusses the impact a court's choice between Bowen and Bradley
7. See, for example, United States v. Heth; 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (holding that
a statute should not apply retroactively unless its text is "so clear, strong, and imperative" that
there is no doubt Congress intended retroactive effect); Murray v. Gibson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 421,
423 (1853) (ruling that a statute should not have retroactive effect unless such effect is required by
its express language or "by necessary and unavoidable implication"); United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908) (holding that
a statute should only apply retroactively if it is the manifest intent of Congress).
8. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). The Supreme Court has at different times adopted different
interpretations of the scope of Schooner Peggy. In Bradley, the Court adopted a broad interpreta-
tion of Schooner Peggy and cited it as holding that a court always should apply the law in effect at
the time of its decision. 416 U.S. at 711-12. In Bonjorno, however, the Court adopted a more
narrow interpretation of the case and cited it as holding only that a change in the law should affect
pending cases if its terms require such a result. 494 U.S. at 836-37. If this second, narrow interpre-
tation of Schooner Peggy is accurate, then the case is reconcilable with the cases holding that there
is a presumption against retroactivity.
10. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
11. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
12. Id. at 711-16. For a discussion of the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity, see
Part II.B.
13. For a list of district courts that have come down on both sides of the retroactivity ques-
tion, see Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1383-84 (8th Cir. 1992) (appendix).
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has on that court's resolution of the Act's retroactivity. Part IV con-
cludes that the Supreme Court should clarify its precedent by rejecting
the Bradley decision and holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does
not apply retroactively.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S PUZZLING PRECEDENT ON PRESUMPTIONS
If the Supreme Court chooses to resolve the confusion surrounding
the retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 the diffi-
culty it will encounter will be well deserved because it is self-imposed.
In the past two decades, the Court has handed down two distinct and
seemingly irreconcilable lines of cases concerning the retroactive appli-
cation of legislation.15 On the one hand, the Court stated in Bowen that
a strong presumption that statutes do not operate retroactively exists. 6
According to the Court, this presumption can be rebutted only if the
text or legislative history of the statute in question clearly manifests
Congress's intent that the statute apply retroactively. 17
On the other hand, the Court also held in Bradley that all statutes
contain a presumption in favor of retroactivity.' 8 Even though the Su-
preme Court decided Bowen after Bradley, it in no way indicated that
its decision overruled Bradley. In fact, the Bowen Court did not even
cite Bradley or attempt to distinguish it.'9 The Supreme Court thus has
presented lower courts with a conundrum: does the presumption oper-
ate in favor of retroactivity or against it? The Court's puzzling prece-
dent on presumptions complicates lower courts' analyses of the
retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Since the Court has never
repudiated either Bowen or Bradley, courts across the country continue
to apply both decisions.20
14. A writ of certiorari that would have given the Supreme Court an opportunity to resolve
the Act's retroactivity was filed on January 7, 1992 in Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630
(8th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for employee), vacated and remanded for further considera-
tion, 111 S.Ct. 1299, rev'd and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 946 F.2d 1340, motion to
vacate judgment denied, 952 F.2d 991 (1991). While the petition was granted, the Court merely
vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of the Act. 112 S.Ct. 1255
(1992). As one court has noted: "If there 'ever was a debate that needed quick resolution by the
Supreme Court, the retroactive vs. prospective application of the new Act is it." Watkins, 782 F.
Supp. at 582.
15. See note 6; Parts II.A and II.B.
16. 488 U.S. at 208.
17. Id. at 208, 213.
18. 416 U.S. at 711-16. Interestingly, even though Bradley represented a major deviation
from the Court's usual application of the presumption against retroactivity, the decision by the
seven participating Justices was unanimous (Justices Marshall and Powell did not participate). Id.
at 724.
19. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09.
20. For courts that have adopted the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity, see FDIC
v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Peppertree Apartments, 942
1322 [Vol. 45:1319
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Because both the legislative history and the text of the Act are am-
biguous as to the Act's retroactive effect,21 a court's decision as to which
presumption to adopt becomes crucial. If a court adopts the Bowen pre-
sumption, it will find that the Act should not apply retroactively.22 But
if it adopts the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity, it proba-
bly will reach the opposite conclusion. True to this prediction, courts
that have adopted Bowen have held overwhelmingly that the Act's pro-
visions should not apply retroactively,23 while courts that have adopted
Bradley have held that the Act should apply retroactively.24 Therefore,
to determine which presumption should prevail, an analysis of the
Court's decisions in Bowen and Bradley is imperative.
A. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital: An Expression of the
Court's Hostility Toward Retroactive Legislation
Bowen's presumption against the retroactive application of legisla-
tion is firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent-Bowen itself is
merely a restatement of the Court's oft-expressed presumption that
statutes should not operate retroactively.2" Lower courts generally rely
on Bowen for the proposition that when a statute is silent or ambiguous
F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1991); Scarboro v. First American Nat'l Bank of Nashville, 619 F.2d
621, 622 (6th Cir. 1980); Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414, 1416-18
(E.D.N.Y. 1988). For courts that have adopted Bowen's (or a Bowen-like) presumption against
retroactivity, see Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991); DeVargas v. Mason
& Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1388-92 (10th Cir. 1990); Nelson v. Ada, 878 F.2d 277,
280 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 117 n.8 (1952)).
21. The Act's legislative history shows that Congress was unable to reach an agreement on
whether the Act should apply retroactively. Republican members of Congress uniformly expressed
the opinion that the Act should not apply retroactively. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15438-85 (Oct. 30,
1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth); 137 Cong. Rec. S15472-78 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole). In contrast, Democratic members of Congress supported retroactive application of the Act.
See 137 Cong. Rec. H9526-32 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 137 Cong. Rec. S15485-
86 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The text of the statute is equally ambiguous. The
provision that sets forth the Act's effective date states only that the Act becomes effective upon
enactment. See note 1 and accompanying text.
22. The Bowen presumption against retroactivity may be rebutted only if the Act's text or
legislative history indicates the Act should apply retroactively. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208. Since the
text and legislative history of the Act do not clearly provide for its retroactive application, the
Bowen presumption should survive unscathed. See Part III.A.
23. See, for example, Simons v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1842
(D. Kan.); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1080-81 (E.D. Va. 1992).
24. See, for example, Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74, 75-77 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1306-08.
25. For cases holding that there is a strong presumption that statutes should not apply retro-
actively, see, for example, The Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wallace) 179 -(1873); Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards
Co., 231 U.S. 190 (1913); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160 (1928); Miller v.
United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141
(1944); Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964).
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as to its retroactive application, that statute presumptively will not ap-
ply retroactively. 6 Although the Bowen Court did state that all statutes
contain a presumption against retroactivity,27 the facts of Bowen and its
holding had nothing to do with retroactive application of a statute that
was silent or ambiguous as to its application. Bowen did not concern a
new statute at all; it addressed an administrative agency's power to pro-
mulgate retroactive regulations.28
In Bowen, Congress delegated to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (the Secretary) the power to promulgate regulations
establishing the amounts the government would reimburse health care
providers for rendering Medicare services.29 On June 30, 1981, the Sec-
retary issued regulations that changed the method for computing health
care providers' reimbursable expenses.3 0 In 1983, the district court in-
validated the 1981 regulations on the grounds that the Secretary had
violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to provide notice
and an opportunity for public comment." In 1984, the Secretary, after
proper procedure, reissued the same regulations and gave them an ef-
fective date of July 1, 1981.32 By adopting this effective date, the Secre-
tary was applying the regulations retroactively to pre-1984 conduct.
The plaintiffs in Bowen argued that the Secretary's retroactive ap-
plication of the regulations violated both the Administrative Procedure
Act and the Medicare Act. 3 The issue before the Bowen Court was
whether Congress, through the Medicare Act, had authorized the Secre-
tary to promulgate retroactive rules.34 The Court held that a statute
should not be construed as authorizing an administrative agency to
26. See, for example, DeVargas, 911 F.2d at 1384-88; Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 913 F.2d 958, 963 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
27. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
28. Id. at 205-07.
29. Id. at 205-06.
30. Id. at 206.
31. Id. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies either publish notice of a
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register or provide individuals affected by the rule with actual
notice. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). Once the agency gives such notice, it must provide interested
individuals an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. Id. § 553(c). The Secretary of Health
and Human Services ignored these two requirements when he promulgated the regulation at issue
in Bowen. 488 U.S. at 206-07.
32. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 207.
33. The plaintiffs in Bowen were health care providers that had economically benefitted from
the invalidation of the 1981 regulation. When the Secretary reissued the 1981 regulation in 1984
and proceeded to apply it retroactively, the Secretary recouped over two million dollars in reim-
bursements that the plaintiffs had received due to the invalidation of the 1981 rule. Id.
34. The Medicare Act contains no express authorization of retroactive rulemaking by the
Secretary. Id. at 209, 213. Both Bowen and the controversy surrounding the retroactive application




adopt retroactive rules unless the statute contained an express delega-
tion of that authority from Congress."5 Since the Medicare Act did not
contain such an express grant of authority, the Court invalidated the
Secretary's retroactive regulations." In the process of reaching this con-
clusion, the Court expressed its bias against retroactive legislation and
cautioned that legislation should not be construed as having retroactive
effect unless its language requires such a result.
37
Bowen presented the Court with the issue of whether a statute that
does not expressly authorize an administrative agency to promulgate
retroactive rules should be construed as granting the agency such au-
thority.38 In Bowen, the Court did not hold that statutes that are silent
or ambiguous as to their application contain a presumption against ret-
roactivity." Rather, it held that statutes that delegate authority to ad-
ministrative agencies contain a presumption that they do not also
delegate the authority to legislate retroactively.
40
The Bowen decision demonstrates the Court's bias against retroac-
tive legislation. Congress does have the power to legislate retroactively,
and if Congress chooses to exercise this power, the Court can do noth-
ing about it.41 The Court, however, can limit the incidence of retroac-
tive legislation by refusing to imply delegations to administrative
agencies of this authority.42 The Court also can limit retroactive legisla-
tion by adopting a presumption that legislation should not apply retro-
actively unless its terms or legislative history explicitly provide that it
should have such effect.
43
Although Bowen does not actually hold that all statutes contain a
presumption against retroactivity, the Court's decision does indicate
that it may be unwilling to imply retroactivity in the case of a statute
that is silent or ambiguous as to its application.44 Bowen, however, is
35. Id. at 213-14.
36. Id. at 215-16.
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id. at 208-09.
39. This is the issue that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 raises. In Bowen, the regulations at
issue were not ambiguous or silent as to their application, but rather expressly provided for their
retroactive application. Thus, strictly speaking, the Court's decision in Bowen does not indicate
how the Court would or should resolve the retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
40. Id. at 208, 215.
41. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984)
(holding that Congress can legislate retroactively if justified by a rational legislative purpose).
42. The Court's refusal to imply delegations of the authority to legislate retroactively shows
its hostility to retroactive legislation. If the Court approved of retroactive legislation it most likely
would imply the delegation of retroactive authority.
43. For example, the Court takes this approach in Greene u. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160
(1964).
44. This conclusion follows from the Court's admitted hostility toward retroactive legislation.
If the Court wants to discourage such legislation, it can do so by refusing to imply retroactive
1992] 1325
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
not the only Supreme Court case that addresses retroactive legislation.
In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, the Court held that under
certain circumstances it would be willing to imply the retroactive appli-
cation of legislation.45 Bowen, however, was decided after Bradley and
seems to stand for the proposition that the Court still believes in the
presumption against retroactivity. The question thus becomes: If the
Supreme Court has believed in the presumption against retroactivity all
along, how did it arrive at its decision in Bradley?
B. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond: A Departure from the
Traditional Approach
On its face, the Bradley opinion does not appear to represent a new
development in retroactivity analysis. The Court cites numerous cases,
dating back to the 1800s, in support of its holding. But despite those
citations, Bradley represents a sharp departure from the Court's tradi-
tional disdain for retroactive legislation, and is a gross expansion of the
cases that preceded it.
1. United States v. Schooner Peggy: The Court Sets Sail Toward a
Presumption of Retroactivity
Bradley has its roots in United States v. Schooner Peggy,46 which
concerned the United States' capture of a French ship. The circuit
court, overruling the district court, found that the schooner (and her
cargo) was the lawful prize of the United States upon capture.47 While
the case was pending on appeal to the Supreme Court, the President
signed a convention with France that required the United States to re-
turn to France any French property that the United States had cap-
tured but had not yet definitively condemned.48
Schooner Peggy presented the Court with the issue of whether it
application. If the Court adopts this stance, then the only statutes that apply retroactively are
those whose text or legislative history expressly provide for such application. Congress often has a
great deal of difficulty agreeing on the retroactivity of statutes. In fact, Congress so often is unable
to decide on acts' retroactivity that the President's Council on Competitiveness has found that the
United States' competitiveness could be increased if Congress decided the retroactivity of each act
it passes. See Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, A Report from the President's Council
on Competitiveness (August 1991) ("Agenda for Civil Justice Reform"). Therefore, a requirement
that statutes must expressly provide for retroactive effect in order to have such effect would cut
back greatly on the incidence of retroactive legislation.
45. 416 U.S. 696, 715-16 (1974). In Bradley, the Court demonstrated its willingness to imply
retroactive application by adopting a rebuttable presumption in favor of retroactive effect. Id.
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). Contrast the contemporaneous United States v. Heth, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (taking a different approach and supporting what will become the
Bowen presumption against retroactivity).
47. 5 U.S. at 104-07.
48. Id. at 107-08.
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should apply the convention in its adjudication of the Schooner Peggy's
appeal even though the convention was not in effect at the time of the
ship's capture nor at the time of the circuit court's adjudication of the
case.49 The Court held that if a relevant law changes before an appellate
court disposes of an appeal, then the appellate court should apply the
new law retroactively to the appeal.5
The actual holding of Schooner Peggy is somewhat ambiguous. The
convention at issue in that case has been interpreted as expressly pro-
viding for its retroactive application. 51 Hence, debate exists as to
whether Schooner Peggy held only that legislation should apply retro-
actively to cases on appeal if its terms so expressly provide,52 or
whether Schooner Peggy went further to hold that appellate courts
should always apply legislation retroactively unless clear evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary exists.5 For many years, Supreme
Court decisions did not delineate the scope of Schooner Peggy's hold-
ing. In the past several decades, however, the Court has adopted a
broad interpretation of Schooner Peggy and even has increased its
scope.54
2. Thorpe v. Housing Authority Of Durham: The Birth Of The
Presumption Of Retroactivity
The Court first broadened Schooner Peggy's application in Thorpe
v. Housing Authority of Durham.5 5 In Thorpe, a tenant sued the City
of Durham after the city's Housing Authority evicted the tenant from a
public housing project.56 At the time of the plaintiff's eviction, and at
the time that the lower court heard the case, no restrictions existed on
the Housing Authority's ability to evict individuals from public hous-
ing.57 Prior to the time the appellate court decided the case, however,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a circular
49. Id.
50. Id. at 110.
51. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 712. The argument in Bradley seems to be that since the con-
vention provided for the return of ships not definitively condemned, its terms required application
of the convention to cases pending or on appeal because in those cases condemnation was not final
or definitive.
52. See Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 836-37. If this is Schooner Peggy's actual holding, the case was
in agreement with other Supreme Court cases of the same time period that held that legislation
should apply retroactively if its text provides for such application. See, for example, Heth, 7 U.S.
at 413.
53. Later decisions like Bradley depend on this broad interpretation of Schooner Peggy. See
416 U.S. at 711-13.
54. See Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 281-83 (1969); Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711-13.
55. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
56. Id. at 271.
57. Id. at 271-72.
1992] 1327
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that required local housing authorities to give tenants notice of the rea-
sons for their evictions. 8 In Thorpe, the Supreme Court interpreted
Schooner Peggy and its progeny as holding that an appellate court al-
ways must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision. 9 Even
though the rule at issue in Thorpe did not expressly state that it should
apply retroactively, the Court nevertheless mandated that the appellate
court apply the rule retroactively.6 0
Thorpe represents a huge expansion of the Schooner Peggy deci-
sion since it demands that appellate courts apply statutes retroactively
even if their terms do not expressly provide for retroactive applica-
tion.' Thorpe represents the birth of the presumption of retroactivity
in statutes that are silent or ambiguous as to their application.2
The Schooner Peggy Court probably neither anticipated nor in-
tended that its decision have such broad effect. In Schooner Peggy, the
Court cautioned that in disputes between mere private parties, courts
should struggle against a statutory construction that would affect the
rights of the parties through retroactivity. Apparently, the Schooner
Peggy Court largely based its decision on the nature of the law and the
identity of the parties involved.6 4 The Schooner Peggy Court's caution
against the retroactive application of legislation in private disputes be-
tween private individuals indicates that it had no intention of holding
that all statutes contain a presumption of retroactivity. Yet, in Thorpe,
the Court ignored this warning and used Schooner Peggy as the founda-
tion for this very conclusion.
65
The Court in Thorpe, however, did limit the applicability of the
presumption of retroactivity: only appellate courts can properly invoke
the presumption that statutes silent or ambiguous as to their applica-
58. Id. at 272.
59. Id. at 281-83.
60. See id. at 283-84.
61. See id.
62. Justice Antonin Scalia noted that the "current confusion" on the question of retroactivity
began with Thorpe. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 844 (Scalia concurring).
63. 5 U.S. at 110. In Schooner Peggy, the United States was a party to the dispute and the
subject of the dispute was a matter of national concern. Schooner Peggy thus did not present the
issue of whether laws should apply retroactively to private disputes between private individuals.
See id.
64. It is possible that the Schooner Peggy Court held as it did to avoid embarrassing the
President in his realm of international affairs.
65. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282.
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fion should apply retroactively.6 6 The Court destroyed this limit in
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond.6
3. The Bradley Decision: The Final Expansion
In Bradley, the Supreme Court expanded Schooner Peggy even
further. The plaintiffs in Bradley sought to recover attorneys' fees they
had incurred in a school desegregation case.68 The district court
awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees even though no statute in effect
at the time provided for the recovery of such fees in school desegrega-
tion cases."' After the district court awarded the fees, Congress passed
the Educational Amendments of 1972, which, in part, authorized courts
to award such fees in school desegregation cases.70 The Amendments
did not expressly provide for their retroactive application.71 The issue
before the court of appeals was whether it should apply the Educational
Amendments retroactively to uphold the district court's award of attor-
neys' fees. The appellate court refused to apply the Educational
Amendments retroactively, thereby negating the award.
72
The Supreme Court then confronted the same issue and held that
the Educational Amendments did indeed have retroactive effect.73
Bradley stands for the proposition that a court should apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision unless (1) the text or legislative
history of the statute at issue indicates that Congress did not intend
retroactive application, or (2) doing so would result in manifest
injustice.74
66. Id. at 281. This interpretation requires emphasizing the Court's use of "appellate court"
in Thorpe: "[An appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders it decision."
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia made this argument in Bonjorno. 494 U.S. at 849 (Scalia
concurring).
67. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
68. Id. at 705-06. The plaintiffs in Bradley brought an action to desegregate the public
schools in Richmond, Virginia. Id. at 699.
69. Id. at 705-06. The district court based its award of attorneys' fees on two grounds. First,
prior desegregation cases indicated that it may be proper for courts to award attorneys' fees when
the evidence shows obstinate noncompliance with the law. The court found that such noncompli-
ance was present in this case. Id. at 706-07. Second, Congress statutorily authorized the recovery of
attorneys' fees in certain civil rights actions. The court concluded that the circumstances that
supported the award of attorneys' fees in those cases were present to an even greater degree in
school desegregation cases. Id. at 708.
70. Id. at 709.
71. Id. at 716 n.23.
72. Id. at 710.
73. Id. at 715-16. In Bradley, the text and legislative history of the Educational Amendments
were silent as to whether they should apply retroactively. Id. at 716 nn.22-23. In applying the
Amendments retroactively, the Court continued the course on which it had embarked in Thorpe.
74. Id. at 711.
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The Bradley Court set forth three factors that a court should con-
sider in determining if retroactive application of legislation would result
in manifest injustice. First, a court should consider the nature and iden-
tity of the parties involved in the dispute. 5 If a case involves a private
dispute between private individuals, then the court should be hesitant
to apply a statute retroactively. 76 Second, a court should consider the
nature of the rights affected by a retroactive application of the stat-
ute. 1 If retroactive application of a statute would deprive an individual
of a right that has matured or become unconditional, then the court
should disfavor such application. 8 Finally, a court should examine the
impact of the change in law on individuals' existing rights.7 9 If the
change in law imposes new and unanticipated obligations on individuals
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, then the court should
not construe the statute to apply retroactively.8 0
Although the Court made a sweeping generalization that all courts
should apply the law in effect at the time of their decisions,81 Bradley
actually involved a Thorpe-type situation in which the law changed
before an appellate court rendered its decision. 2 Therefore, Bradley
should be interpreted as reaffirming Thorpe's holding that only an ap-
pellate court should apply retroactively the law in effect at the time of
its decision. 3 Several appellate court decisions after Bradley, however,
have adopted a broader interpretation of the case and have held that all
courts, not just appellate courts, should apply retroactively the law in
effect at the time of decision, rather than the law in effect when the suit
was filed.' In addition, district courts that have considered the retroac-
tivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have cited Bradley for the proposi-
75. Id. at 717-18.
76. Id. This prong of the manifest injustice test finds its support in Schooner Peggy's caution
that in "mere private cases between individuals, courts will and ought to struggle hard against a
construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of the parties." Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. at 110. The Court in Bradley characterized school desegregation litigation as "of a
kind different from 'mere private cases between individuals.'" 416 U.S. at 718.
77. 416 U.S. at 720.
78. Id. No such right existed in Bradley, according to the Supreme Court. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Bradley Court found no increased burden on or change in the substantive obliga-
tion of the school board. Id. at 720-21. In general, since individuals never will have notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a case of retroactive application, the real issue is whether the statute
creates a new, unanticipated obligation.
81. Id. at 711.
82. Compare Bradley, 416 U.S. at 709 (change in statute), with Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 272
(change in rule).
83. See note 66 and accompanying text.
84. See, for example, FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.




tion that all statutes contain a presumption in favor of retroactivity.8 5
The Supreme Court in Bradley probably did not intend to expand
Schooner Peggy into a strong presumption that all statutes should have
retroactive effect. Schooner Peggy, Thorpe, and Bradley were all cases
in which the law changed between the decisions of a lower court and an
appellate court.86 Arguably, the Supreme Court only intended the pre-
sumption of retroactivity to apply in these circumstances. In Thorpe,
the Court made no mention of the numeorus cases supporting a pre-
sumption against retroactivity.17 Rather, the Court cited several cases
that involved changes in the law that had occurred while appeals were
pending, or that were otherwise exceptionable.8 The Court's failure to
distinguish the first set of cases, which contained a presumption against
retroactivity, indicates that the Court believed that the circumstances
in Thorpe were unique and merited a different presumption-one in
favor of retroactivity. 9 The Supreme Court has never mentioned the
presumption in favor of retroactivity in cases in which the change in
law occurred prior to adjudication, except when the change results from
judicial decision or repeals a criminal statute.90 This omission supports
the argument that the Court only intended the Bradley presumption of
retroactivity to apply when the change in law occurred after initial ad-
judication and before appeal.
Thus, Bowen and Bradley can be reconciled. Under Supreme Court
precedent, the Bowen presumption against retroactivity should apply
only to those cases in which the change in statutory law occurs before
any adjudication of the dispute, while the Bradley presumption in favor
of retroactivity should apply only to those cases in which the change in
statutory law occurs between the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts. Interpreting Bowen and Bradley as addressing two factually dis-
tinct situations explains the Supreme Court's failure to distinguish, or
even mention, the Bradley decision in Bowen.
85. See, for example, Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1306-07 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 96-97 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
86. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 107 (change in international agreement pending appeal to
the Supreme Court); Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 272 (change in rule pending appeal to the Supreme
Court); Bradley, 416 U.S. at 709 (change in statute pending appeal to court of appeals).
87. See Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 281-83. See also Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 845 (Scalia concurring)
(stating that Thorpe "made no mention of our earlier presumption against retroactive application,
and cited none of the numerous cases supporting that rule").
88. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 281-83, especially nn.38-42 (citing Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318
U.S. 73 (1943); Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941); United States v.
Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934); Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co.,
309 U.S. 23 (1940)). See also Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 846-48 (Scalia concurring) (discussing cases
cited in Thorpe).
89. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 845 (Scalia concurring).
90. Id. at 850 (Scalia concurring).
1992] 1331
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
So, under this reading of Bowen and Bradley, the identity of the
court before which a case is pending at the time of the new law's enact-
ment determines which presumption should apply. However, the exis-
tence of two separate presumptions whose applicability depends upon
whether the change in law occurs before or after initial adjudication of
the dispute is problematic because it leads to illogical results. For ex-
ample, a plaintiff who has won a tort judgment could be nonsuited if
the legislature enacts a statute abolishing the tort while the case is on
appeal.91 In contrast, a plaintiff who brings suit after the statute's en-
actment would be allowed to proceed to judgment despite the existence
of the statute, because the tort was actionable when it occurred., 2
Different treatment of these two plaintiffs is illogical and unfair as
there is no reason to apply different presumptions depending on the
identity of the court before which the case is pending at the time of the
new legislation's enactment. The Court never has enunciated any justi-
fication for these dual presumptions, but the argument may be that ap-
pellate courts should not be forced to apply laws that are no longer in
effect. This argument, however, applies with equal vigor to trial courts.
No meaningful reason exists for the Court's requirement that one court
apply outdated law while the other is allowed to disregard it.
Any meaningful evaluation of a law's potential retroactivity must
focus on the individuals, not the courts, involved. While the courts are
interchangeable, the individuals affected by various retroactive applica-
tions may not be. An examination of the two plaintiffs described above
illustrates the unfair results created by the Bowen/Bradley dichotomy.
The first plaintiff suffered an injury, brought a lawsuit, and received a
judgment while tort liability still existed. All the second plaintiff did
91. See id. at 854 (Scalia concurring). In this situation, the Bradley presumption of retroac-
tivity would apply since the change in law occurred while the case was on appeal. The presumption
would be determinative as long as (1) the statute did not explicitly state that it should not apply
retroactively, and (2) retroactive application would not result in manifest injustice. Bradley, 416
U.S. at 711. Retroactive application of the statute in the hypothetical would not result in manifest
injustice. Although the statute would not pass muster under the first prong of the three-part mani-
fest injustice test as set forth in Bradley because the case involves a dispute between private indi-
viduals, since the other two prongs are met, a court would be unlikely to find that manifest
injustice had resulted. Retroactive application satisfies the second prong of the test because the
statute does not deprive individuals of a vested right. See Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 706 F.2d
1130 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that there is no vested right to a lower court judgment pending on
appeal). Finally, retroactive application does not run afoul of the third prong because the statute
does not create new or unanticipated obligations. Since the statute does not explicitly provide that
it should apply only prospectively, and since retroactive application of the statute would not result
in manifest injustice, the statute would have retroactive effect under Bradley.
92. See Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 854 & n.2 (Scalia concurring). In this scenario, the Bowen
presumption against retroactivity would apply since the case was not pending before an appellate
court at the time of the new law's enactment. This presumption would be determinative because
the text and legislative history of the statute do not clearly provide for retroactive application.
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while tort liability existed was suffer an injury. Yet, the Bowen/Bradley
dichotomy mandates that the court deny the first plaintiff recovery
while allowing the second plaintiff's case to proceed to judgment. In
effect, the Bowen/Bradley dichotomy penalizes the first plaintiff for
bringing a timely suit and recovering a lawful judgment. Since the
Bowen/Bradley dichotomy inevitably leads to irrational and arbitrary
results, the Court should adopt one presumption to apply in all
circumstances.
C. The Battle of the Presumptions
The Court should reverse Bradley and reaffirm the presumption
against retroactivity. Bradley rests on a weak precedential foundation
and directly contradicts numerous cases holding that all statutes con-
tain a presumption against retroactivity. In addition, retroactive appli-
cation of legislation offends fundamental notions of justice and fair
play.9 3 Courts should not judge individuals against standards that did
not exist at the time of their conduct94 -the Constitution itself ex-
presses these sentiments through its prohibition of the retroactive ap-
plication of punitive laws. 5
Even the Court's decisions that espouse a presumption in favor of
retroactivity acknowledge the dangers of retroactive legislation. In fact,
the Court never has made the leap of holding that all statutes that are
silent or ambiguous as to their application should apply retroactively.
Rather, the Court has tempered retroactive application first by holding
that the presumption of retroactivity applies only to appellate courts,96
and later by holding that the presumption should not apply if retroac-
tive application would result in manifest injustice.
9 7
The existence of these limitations, however, does not justify the
retroactive application of legislation. Even in cases in which retroactive
legislation would not result in manifest injustice as defined in Bradley,
retroactive application nonetheless will result in a more subtle variety
of injustice by judging individuals against standards not in existence at
the time of their conduct. Thus, the Court should remain true to its
traditional precedent and further the interests of justice by adopting
the Bowen presumption against retroactivity.
93. See id. at 855-56 (Scalia concurring).
94. "The principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the
law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal." Id. at 855
(Scalia concurring).
95. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
96. See note 66 and accompanying text.
97. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
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III. LOWER COURT CONFUSION REGARDING RETROACTIVITY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The combination of Congress's refusal to decide the retroactivity of
the Civil Rights Act of 199198 and the Supreme Court's inability to pro-
vide the lower courts with a workable standard for analyzing retroactiv-
ity has caused the lower courts considerable difficulty. Not surprisingly,
courts across the country have reached vastly different conclusions on
the Act's retroactivity. A court's choice between the Bowen or Bradley
presumptions is determinative not only of the mode of analysis the
court will follow, but also of the conclusion the court will reach.
A. The Bowen Courts
Under Bowen, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should not apply retro-
actively unless its text or legislative history demonstrates Congress's
clear intent that the Act have such application. 9 Every court that has
adopted Bowen has concluded that neither the Act's text nor its legisla-
tive history provide the clear evidence of Congress's intent that is nec-
essary to hold that the Act has retroactive effect. 100
1. The Act's Language as Ambiguous
Section 402(a) of the Act generally states that the Act's provisions
take effect upon enactment unless specific sections of the Act provide
otherwise.' Section 102, which establishes the rights to compensatory
and punitive damages and to a trial by jury, does not include a specific
effective date. 02 Thus, Section 402(a) is the only section that directly
addresses the retroactivity of Section 102. Most courts agree that Sec-
tion 402(a) neither supports nor refutes retroactive application of the
Act.10 3 Some Bowen courts have not looked beyond these sections and
98. The President's Council on Competitiveness has recommended that Congress resolve the
issue of retroactivity in every statute it passes in order to avoid litigation on the subject. See
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform (cited in note 44).
99. - Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09.
100. See, for example, West v. Pelican Management Services Corp., 782 F. Supp. 1132, 1133-
36 (M.D. La. 1992); Simons v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1842, *7-*9 (D.
Kan.); Johnson v. Rice, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 830, *4 (S.D. Ohio); Burchfield v. Derwinski, 782 F.
Supp. 532, 535-36 (D. Colo. 1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1078-80
(E.D. Va. 1992)
101. See note 1 and accompanying text.
102. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-74.
103. See Khandelwal, 780 F. Supp. at 1078; Hansel v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 778 F.
Supp. 1126, 1132 (D. Colo. 1991). For an example of an act in which Congress explicitly provided
for retroactive application, see the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amend-
ments of 1984 § 28(a), Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639, 1655 (1984) (stating that "the amend-
ments made by this Act shall be effective on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply both
with respect to claims filed after such date and to claims pending on such date").
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therefore have concluded that the text of the Act does not provide
strong evidence that Congress intended the Act to apply retroac-
tively.10 4 Other language exists, however, that may express Congress's
intent as to the retroactive application of the Act. Several provisions
establish different effective dates to apply in certain limited situations.
First, Section 402(b) provides that the Act shall not apply to disparate
impact cases' 05 in which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975,
and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.16
Second, Section 109(c) explicitly states that amendments to Section
109107 shall not apply to conduct that occurred before the Act's enact-
ment.10 Section 402(b) and Section 109(c) thus specifically delineate
certain instances in which the Act will not operate retroactively. The
mere presence of these sections provides some support for the argument
that Congress intended the rest of the Act to apply retroactively.
10 9
The Bowen courts, however, have downplayed the significance of
Sections 402(b) and 109(c). These courts emphasize that Congress en-
acted both sections to address the Act's application to certain landmark
cases.110 The Bowen courts argue that Congress enacted Section 402(b)
for the sole purpose of ensuring that the disparate impact provisions of
the Act would not apply to the defendant in Wards Cove Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Antonio."' Similarly, they assert that Congress included Section
109(c) in the Act solely to prevent a reopening of EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Company.' 2 Therefore, the Bowen courts have concluded
that Sections 402(b) and 109(c) do not demonstrate Congress's intent as
104. See, for example, Burchfield, 782 F. Supp. at 535.
105. A disparate impact claim arises when employment policies, regardless of intent, weigh
more heavily on one group than on another. See, for example, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 430-32 (1971).
106. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099.
107. Section 109 protects extraterritorial employment. Id. § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077.
108. Id. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1078.
109 See, for example, Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1304; Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F.
Supp. 74, 75-76 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
110. See, for example, Maddox v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 582, 584-85 (N.D. Ala.
1992).
111. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Wards Cove is the only case that meets the Section 402(b) prereq-
uisites. Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 584. Wards Cove involves an Alaskan company that spent ap-
proximately two decades defending a disparate impact challenge. Id. at 647-49. The legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly states that Section 402(b) was enacted to "elimi-
nate every shadow of a doubt as to any possibility of retroactive application" to Wards Cove. 137
Cong. Rec. S15953 (Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Murkowski). See also 137 Cong. Rec. S15478
(Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
112. 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991). In Arabian American Oil, the Court held that Title VII does not
apply to employment in foreign countries. Section 109 of the Act legislatively overrules this case by
establishing the applicability of Title VII to employment in foreign countries. Commentators have
referred to Section 109(c), which provides that the section should not apply retroactively, as the
"Arabian American exception." See Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 584.
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to the general application of the Act, but only demonstrate that Con-
gress did not intend the Act to apply to these two specific cases.
1 3
The Bowen courts are correct: even if Sections 402(b) and 109(c) do
provide a scintilla of evidence that Congress intended the Act to apply
retroactively, they do not provide the strong evidence of congressional
intent necessary to rebut the Bowen presumption against retroactiv-
ity.114 The Bowen courts find support for their argument that Congress
did not intend the Act to apply retroactively in Section 102(a), which
provides that a complaining party shall have the right to seek compen-
satory and punitive damages and demand a trial by jury."' The Act
defines "complaining party" as either a person who is "seeking to
bring" an action under Section 102(a) or a person who "may bring an
action" under either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991.116
Since the Act defines "complaining party" as an individual who
may bring an action in the future, some courts have interpreted this
language to mean that the Act will not apply in actions that were com-
menced prior to its enactment. 17 These courts, however, seem to be
straining to find some evidence of a congressional intent that the Act
should apply only prospectively. The fact is that evidence of this sort
does not exist."18 At any rate, the lower courts' arguments along these
lines are superfluous since Bowen does not require that courts justify
their holdings that legislation should not apply retroactively with evi-
dence of a congressional intent against retroactivity.1'9 Under Bowen,
the Act should not operate retroactively unless the legislative history
evidences intent in favor of retroactivity.
2. The Legislative History as Party Politics
The legislative history of the Act only confuses the issue of retroac-
tivity. In fact, Congressmen themselves have directed courts to ignore
their statements on the subject of retroactivity since they provide no
113. Senator Dole, one of the sponsors of the Act, cautions courts not to interpret Section
402(b) as supporting general retroactive application of the Act. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15953.
114. Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 584-85.
115. See note 2. These sections are now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (Supp. 1992).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
117. See Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D.D.C. 1991).
118. The legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that Congress did not reach an agree-
ment that the Act should only apply prospectively. In fact, Congress did not reach any agreement
on the issue of the Act's application. For a discussion of Congress's inability to reach agreement on
the issue of retroactivity, see J. Stephen Poor, Rights Act's Retroactivity Still Disputed, Nat'l L.
J. 19, 22-23 (Jan. 27, 1992).
119. Bowen requires only that a court find that no clear congressional intent that the Act
apply retroactively exists, not that the court find evidence that Congress intended that the Act
should not apply retroactively. 488 U.S. at 208-09.
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meaningful evidence of congressional intent.12 In fact, statements of
various members of Congress cannot reflect Congress's intent as an in-
stitution because those remarks are hopelessly in conflict.121 Retroactiv-
ity apparently was the one aspect of the Act upon which Congress could
not agree.' 22
Some Bowen courts have looked beyond the rhetoric and analyzed
the political climate in which Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991.123 The Act's 1990 predecessor explicitly applied to cases pending
on the date of its enactment.124 President Bush vetoed the bill, 2 ' al-
though both the House and the Senate had approved it. 26 The 1991
House version of the Act originally included a similar provision estab-
lishing the Act's applicability to cases pending on the date of its enact-
ment. 2 7 The Senate, however, removed this provision.12  The Act, as
signed by President Bush, does not expressly provide for its application
to pending cases. 129 Therefore, one can infer that Congress sacrificed
the retroactivity of the Act in order to obtain the President's support.
The procedural history of the Act, coupled with Congress's inabil-
ity to reach agreement on the issue, indicates that Congress did, indeed
compromise on retroactivity in order to secure the Act's passage. 3 '
120. Senator Danforth stated that the legislative history contained only inconsistent and
conflicting statements from the members of Congress and thus a court should consider only the
language of the statute and the appropriate rules of statutory interpretation in deciding the Act's
retroactivity. 137 Cong. Rec. S15325 (Oct. 29, 1991), and S15483 (Oct. 30, 1991).
121. Contrast statements in favor of retroactivity, 137 Cong. Rec. H9526-32 (Nov. 7, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Edwards); 137 Cong. Rec. S15485-86 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy) with statements opposing retroactivity, 137 Cong. Rec. S15472-78 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Dole); 137 Cong. Rec. S15483-85 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Courts have
noted that "one can find what seems to be an equal number of opinions supporting both prospec-
tive and retroactive application of the Act." Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 585.
122. The Senate's principal sponsors of the Act, Senators Danforth and Kennedy, issued an
interpretive memorandum in which they agreed on every aspect of the Act except its retroactivity.
137 Cong. Rec. S15483-86 (Oct. 30, 1991).
123. See, for example, Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 585.
124. Section 15 of S.2104, the conference version of the bill, provided for application of the
Act to proceedings pending on the date of enactment. See 136 Cong. Rec. H10691 (Oct. 19, 1990)
(bill's enrollment in the House); 136 Cong. Rec. S16239 (Oct. 19, 1990) (bill's enrollment in the
Senate).
125. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16457. Among the reasons the President cited for his veto was the
bill's "unfair retroactivity rules." 136 Cong. Rec. S16562 (Oct. 24, 1990).
126. See 136 Cong. Rec. S15327 (Oct. 16, 1990) (Senate's approval of the bill); 136 Cong. Rec.
H9984 (Oct. 17, 1990) (House's approval of the bill).
127. See H.R. Rep. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. S113 (1991).
128. See Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 585 (noting that the provision was removed).
129. See note 1 and accompanying text. Congress avoided the issue of retroactivity by stating
ambiguously that the Act should become effective on its date of enactment. See also notes 101
through 119 and accompanying text.
130. See Maddox, 783 F. Supp. at 585. Some courts have interpreted the President's refusal
to sign the bill and Congress's subsequent enactment of a compromise bill as providing clear evi-
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'Since Congress itself could not garner the support to pass the Act with
a provision calling for retroactivity, courts should not step in and inter-
pret the Act as having this effect. 3 '
The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress, as a
whole, did not have strong intent as to whether the Act should have
retroactive application. The Bowen courts, therefore, are correct in con-
cluding that the language of the Act did not provide clear evidence of a
strong congressional intent that the statute have retroactive effect.'32
3. The Inevitable Conclusion
Once a court adopts the Bowen presumption against retroactivity,
holding that the Act should not apply retroactively is a foregone conclu-
sion. The ambiguous text and the convoluted legislative history of the
Act do not provide the clear evidence of congressional intent required
to rebut the Bowen presumption. However, if a court adopts the Brad-
ley presumption, it will redch a very different conclusion.
B. The Bradley Courts
Under Bradley, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply retroac-
tively unless (1) the text or legislative history of the Act provides other-
wise, or (2) retroactive application of the Act would result in manifest
injustice. 3 Thus, like their counterparts that adopt the Bowen pre-
sumption, Bradley courts must engage in an in-depth analysis of the
Act's text and legislative history. Courts that have adopted Bradley




1. Text as Expressive of Retroactive Intent
Courts adopting Bradley do not have to find evidence of Congress's
retroactive intent in order to apply the Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroac-
tively. Instead, the courts only need to find an absence of evidence indi-
dence that Congress intended the Act to apply only prospectively. See, for example, Fray, 960 F.2d
at 1378 (stating that "any other conclusion simply ignores the realities of the legislative process").
131. If courts interpret the Act as applying retroactively, then it will have retroactive appli-
cation "despite the fact that there was [sic] not sufficient votes available to push a statute having
express retroactive effect through the various checks and balances that the Constitution has estab-
lished for our legislative process." West, 782 F. Supp. at 1137. It is not the function of the courts
to achieve that which the legislature could not itself achieve. Id.
132. The language of the Act could not provide strong evidence of a clear congressional in-
tent if this intent did not in fact exist.
133. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
134. See, for example, Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (S.D. Fla.
1992); Bristow v. Drake Street, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 499 (N.D. Ill.); Goldsmith v. City of
Atmore, 782 F. Supp. 106, 107-08 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
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cating that Congress did not intend the Act to apply retroactively. 135
Nevertheless, the Bradley courts often interpret the language of the Act
as directly expressing Congress's intent that the Act apply retroactively.
The Bradley courts place great significance on Sections 402(a) and
109(c).136 They argue that if a court interprets the Act as having general
prospective effect, then these provisions become meaningless.137 The
Supreme Court has warned that courts should hesitate to interpret a
statute in a way that renders any of its provisions superfluous. 13s There-
fore, the Bradley courts have concluded that the Act should be inter-
preted as applying retroactively in order to render each and every one
of its provisions meaningful. 39
The argument that Sections 402(b) and 109(c) evidence Congress's
intent that the Act apply retroactively has two problems. First, Con-
gress apparently enacted the above sections only to ensure the Act's
nonapplication to two specific cases. 40 Congress, unable to reach a con-
sensus on the retroactivity of the Act, was forced to leave the decision
to the courts, and Congress had no way of knowing how the courts
would resolve the issue.' Therefore, Congress probably included Sec-
tions 402(b) and 109(c) so that even if the courts decided the Act
should have retroactive effect, it would not apply to Wards Cove 42 and
Arabian American Oil.143 Thus, Sections 402(b) and 109(c) probably in-
dicate only that Congress could not reach an agreement on the issue of
general retroactivity, not that Congress intended the Act to apply
retroactively.
The second problem is that the first exception to the Bradley pre-
sumption revolves around an actual congressional intent. That is, the
Bradley courts' analyses of Sections 402(b) and 109(c) are attempts to
ascertain the actual intent of Congress.' Yet the Bradley courts' inter-
135. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
136. See, for example, Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating
that these provisions are evidence that the statute should not be interpreted as applying only
prospectively). See Part III.A.1 for a discussion of Sections 402(b) and 109(c).
137. See, for example, Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (N.D. Cal.
1992). That is, if the entire Act applies only prospectively, then there is no reason to carve out
certain instances in which the Act would not apply retroactively.
138. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988).
139. See, for example, Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1304.
140. See notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
141. See King v. Shelby Medical Center, 779 F. Supp. 157, 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991). Congres-
sional uncertainty as to how the Supreme Court would resolve the issue of retroactivity is under-
standable considering the existence of the Bowen/Bradley dichotomy. See Fray, 960 F.2d at 1377
(finding that Congress was not certain how courts would resolve the retroactivity issue, and there-
fore "hedged their bets").
142. See note 111 and accompanying text.
143. See note 112 and accompanying text.
144. See, for example, Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1304.
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pretation of these sections as indicative of Congress's intent contradicts
overwhelming evidence that no actual congressional intent exists.14,5
Since the courts' analyses of the Act's language should be no more than
attempts to divine actual congressional intent, these courts should not
use statutory canons to create intent where none exists.
2. Legislative History as Ambiguous
Both the Bradley and Bowen courts agree that the statements of
various members of Congress establish only that Congress could not
reach an agreement on the issue of retroactivity. 14 6 The legislative de-
bates, therefore, do not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the Bradley
presumption of retroactivity because they do not contain a clear state-
ment of Congress's intent that the Act apply only prospectively.
Some Bradley courts have looked beyond the political proselytzing
of Congress to the purposes behind the Act's enactment. 47 Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in response to recent Supreme
Court decisions restricting the scope of civil rights statutes. 48 Many
Bradley courts, therefore, have characterized the Act as remedial or re-
storative.149 When Congress enacts legislation in response to a disfa-
vored Supreme Court interpretation of previous legislation, thereby
returning the law to its original state, some courts have held that the
new legislation should be applied retroactively. 50 The Bradley courts
thus argue that the remedial nature of the Act supports its retroactive
145. The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress was deeply divided on the subject
of the Act's retroactivity. See note 121.
146. See, for example, Goldsmith, 782 F. Supp. at 106-07.
147. See, for example, Graham, 782 F. Supp. at 76; Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1305-06.
148. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. The Act legislatively overrules sev-
eral recent Supreme Court decisions. For example, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
244-45 (1989), held that an employer can avoid liability for intentional discrimination in mixed
motive cases if the employer can show that it would have taken the same action even if its discrim-
inatory motive were absent. Section 107 of the Act legislatively overrules this holding by providing
that an employer is liable whenever race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor in an employment decision, even if other factors contributed to the decision. Similarly, Sec-
tion 108 of the Act overrules Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), by providing that individuals
cannot challenge a consent decree if they had a reasonable opportunity to object to the decree or if
their interests were adequately represented by another party. Section 101 of the Act overrules
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), by abolishing limits on the scope of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 created by the Court in Patterson. And Section 113 of the Act overrules West Vir-
ginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991), by allowing recovery of expert witness fees as a
component of attorneys' fees.
149. See, for example, Graham, 782 F. Supp. at 76; Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1306 (drawing
parallel to Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which, while silent as to retroactivity, has been
applied retroactively).
150. See Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 665-66 (11th Cir. 1990); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832
F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987); Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414,




Although this argument has some force, it is irrelevant in the Brad-
ley analysis of retroactivity. Bradley courts do not have the burden of
proving that the Act should apply retroactively. Rather, the courts need
only find that there is no evidence that the Act should not apply retro-
actively and that retroactive application of the Act would not be mani-
festly unjust.5 ' The remedial nature of the Act does not directly
influence either of these determinations. Since neither the legislative
history nor the plain language of the Act evidence a congressional in-
tent that the Act should not apply retroactively, the manifest injustice
test becomes dispositive.
3. The Manifest Injustice Test
In Bradley, the Supreme Court set forth three factors courts
should evaluate in determining whether the retroactive application of a
statute would result in manifest injustice. 5 The first prong addresses
the nature and identity of the parties involved in the underlying dis-
pute.15 4 Retroactive application of the Act does not necessarily run
afoul of the Supreme Court's caution that courts should hesitate to ap-
ply a law retroactively in a mere private dispute between private indi-
viduals. Courts have indicated that retroactive application of legislation
in a dispute between private parties does not result in manifest injus-
tice if the subject of the dispute is a matter of public concern. 5  Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to promote equality
and provide a remedy for discrimination. 56 Since achieving equality
and remedying discrimination are of importance to the general public,
claims brought under the Act are a matter of public concern. 7 Because
parties to a lawsuit brought under the Act find themselves embroiled in
a dispute of public concern, the first prong of the Bradley test favors
retroactive application.
58
Under the second prong, courts must consider the nature of the
individual rights that a retroactive application of the Act would af-
fect.'59 Courts should avoid retroactive application of the Act if it would
151. See Graham, 782 F. Supp. at 76; Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1305-06.
152. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
153. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
154. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717-18.
155. See, for example, In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that mani-
fest injustice would result from retroactive application in this "routine private dispute," but that it
may not in a private dispute involving a significant public concern).
156. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 2, 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
157. See Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 98.
158. Id.
159. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
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deprive an individual of matured or unconditional rights. 160 Bradley
courts consistently have held that retroactive application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 would not deprive individuals of any unconditional
rights: a defendant in a civil rights case does not have an unconditional
right to a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial. 6 ' Nor does a defendant
have an unconditional right to immunity from compensatory or puni-
tive damages. 62 The unconditional rights that Civil Rights defendants
do enjoy, the Act does not infringe upon. For example, retroactive ap-
plication of the Act would not deprive defendants of their rights to in-
troduce all admissable evidence and fully present their cases at trial.
6 3
Because retroactive application of the Act does not deprive individuals
of vested rights, the second prong of the Bradley test favors retroactive
application of the Act as well.
Finally, under the third prong, courts should consider the nature of
the individual rights a retroactive operation of the Act would affect.
6 4
If retroactive application of the Act would impose new and unantici-
pated obligations on individuals, then courts should not apply the Act
.retroactively. 16 The provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that es-
tablish the availability of compensatory and punitive damages as well
as trial by jury do not impose new obligations upon defendants; 66 they
provide plaintiffs with an additional remedy for conduct that was al-
ready prohibited under the Act's predecessor. 67 Therefore, the third
prong of the Bradley test also supports retroactive application of the
Act.
Since retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would
neither contradict Congress's clear intent nor result in manifest injus-
tice, Bradley courts conclude that the Act should apply retroactively.
Thus, the Bowen and Bradley courts, like Congress, are unable to agree
on the Act's retroactivity. The Bowen and Bradley courts will continue
to clash until the Supreme Court steps in and provides the lower courts
with a clear mandate.
160. Id.
161. See, for example, Goldsmith, 782 F. Supp. at 107-08; Long v. Carr, 784 F. Supp. 887, 891
(N.D. Ga. 1992).
162. See Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
163. See Long, 784 F. Supp. at 891.
164. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
165. See id. at 720-21.
166. See Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 99.
167. See Long, 784 F. Supp. at 891.
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IV. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR ACTION
The Supreme Court must resolve the conflict between Bowen and
Bradley. 1 8 Lower courts should not be forced to waste precious judicial
resources attempting to make fine distinctions in reconciling these two
cases when the Supreme Court could easily resolve any confusion. The
Supreme Court should clarify its position on retroactivity by laying the
Bradley presumption of retroactivity to rest.
The only explanation for the Supreme Court's continued unwilling-
ness to settle this conflict must be that the Court is interpreting Bowen
and Bradley as applying in two factually distinct circumstances. 16 9
Bearing in mind the Court's application of these two decisions, Bradley,
if retained at all, should be confined to cases in which the change in law
occurs between the decision of the trial court and the appellate court.
Such a solution, however, would be unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court
should not continue to avoid resolution of the conflicting presumptions
by confining each to its own arena. The Court must confront the issue
head on and choose one presumption that will apply in all determina-
tions of legislative retroactivity.
Fairness and traditional Supreme Court precedent dictate that the
Bowen presumption should prevail. The Bradley presumption in favor
of retroactivety makes retroactive legislation the norm rather than the
exception,7 in spite of the fact that retroactive legislation never has
played this role in our society. Rather, this country since its birth right-
fully has viewed retroactive legislation suspiciously.
17'
Given the disfavored status of retroactive legislation, Congress
should have the burden of enacting legislation with explicit retroactive
language if it wants such legislation to apply retroactively. Courts
should not help Congress to do that which it cannot do for itself-if
Congress cannot garner enough political support to ensure that a stat-
ute will have retroactive effect, then the statute should not apply retro-
168. Some commentators have argued that courts should determine retroactivity issues based
on an assessment of the particular effects of retroactive application of specific schemes. See Mi-
chele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 2035, 2077 (1992). Such an approach eliminates the need for a clarification of the
Bowen/Bradley dichotomy. The Supreme Court should not adopt this approach, however, because
it would require lower courts to make an in-depth inquiry into the policies underlying a statute
before deciding on the statute's retroactivity. Scarce judicial resources are better preserved by
providing courts with a presumption concerning retroactivity.
169. See Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 849-54 (Scalia concurring).
170. Under the traditional reading of Bradley, all statutes have potential retroactive applica-
tion. Any statute enacted by Congress that does not explicitly define its application as prospective
will apply retroactively unless such application would be manifestly unjust.
171. See Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 855-56 (Scalia concurring).
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actively. The Bowen presumption against retroactivity achieves this
result.
Once the Court adopts the Bowen presumption against retroactiv-
ity, the retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will no
longer be an issue. The Act's text and legislative history simply do not
evidence the strong retroactive intent necessary to rebut the Bowen
presumption. Therefore, as most courts following Bowen have con-
cluded, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should not apply retroactively.
Kristine N. McAlister
